Beating the nationalist drum

Before proposing the best way to resolve difficulties or at least improve the situation along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, let me make it clear that claims of beheading of an Indian soldier by troops of the Pakistan army are nonsense. There was certainly some sort of clash, probably an ambush, that resulted in the deaths of two Indian soldiers, but if – and it’s a big ‘if’ – the incident involved an ambush by a Pakistan army unit (as distinct from a terrorist group), there is no possibility whatsoever that it carried out mutilation of dead bodies. I won’t go into the moral implications of this aspect of the affair, because that would be futile. But, ‘without prejudice’ as the lawyers say, I’ll examine the practicalities.

There has been a great deal of hysterical commentary by people who should know better and who obviously have no idea what an ambush is like. It’s terrifying, extremely bloody, and very fast moving.

A professional ambush takes only minutes from detection of an enemy to vacation of the scene by the ambushers. There is a very short burst of concentrated fire, perhaps half a minute – which is a very long time in war – when thousands of rounds can be fired and directional mines triggered at chest-height. It is more than probable that a human target could have his head ripped from his body by such an intense blitz. Then the attackers move very quickly indeed to get out of the area. There will be artillery fire brought down immediately (if the ambushed group belongs to a thoroughly professional organisation, which describes the Indian army), rapid movement of reserve forces to block likely escape routes, and scrambling of ground attack aircraft to strafe the ambush party. Those who conducted the ambush don’t have time to go round slitting throats or beheading people. They are concentrating on one thing and one thing only: survival by getting out of the area as rapidly as possible.



When one examines the known facts, it appears most unlikely that a Pakistan army unit was involved. The claims and counter-claims, the allegations and refutations will continue to be exchanged concerning this incident and the earlier one in which a Pakistan army soldier was killed. It is useless to debate all this, because inevitably there will continue to be flat statements, followed by flat contradictions, followed by virulent abuse. Hysteria abounds, and ultra-nationalism is rearing its slavering, blood-fanged head. What is certain is that soldiers of both armies have died, and everything possible should be done to ensure that incidents of this sort should not happen again.

Which brings us to international law; whether India likes it or not, the fact remains that on the books of the UN Security Council (UNSC) the Kashmir region is a disputed territory. UNSC Resolution 122 has not been repealed or amended. It states, inter alia, that “the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.”

Furthermore, Security Council Resolution 307 “demands that a durable cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities” involving withdrawal of troops “to positions which fully respect the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir supervised by the UN Military Observer group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP).”

India desperately wants to be a permanent member of the Security Council and dare not take any action that would diminish its (perfectly reasonable) claim for inclusion, so it simply ignores the inconvenience of the Kashmir Resolutions.

But it is time the UNSC flexed its muscles about Kashmir, and these recent incidents could be the spur for action. Few could now propose in all seriousness that India should give up the valley and its environs. There is no point in pursuing this, because India will simply never give up the territory it has taken, Security Council or no Security Council, and we have to accept this unpalatable fact. But there is now an opportunity to defuse tension and reduce the possibility of clashes along the LoC.

India staunchly resists UN involvement in Kashmir. Unlike Pakistan, it refuses cooperation with the UN military mission, UNMOGIP. I recollect being denied access to the Indian side of the Line of Control, while carrying out an official investigation of the shooting at a UN observer who was under Indian machine gun fire for an hour. There was no doubt he was under fire; I even retrieved a bullet-shredded UN flag. And he didn’t dream it up, although Delhi flatly denied it happened. But the time has come for India to cooperate with the UN over the Line of Control.

Quite simply, there should be withdrawal of troops of Pakistan and India from the immediate vicinity of the LoC. They should relocate to positions at a minimum of two miles from it, and be replaced by UN troops on both sides. There is a plan for this in the UN headquarters in New York; it’s all been worked out before. It would not be an easy redeployment for either army. Indeed it would be time-consuming, costly and inconvenient. But it would reduce tension, save money in the longer-term, and (although this doesn’t seem to be high on the list of politicians’ priorities) actually save soldiers’ lives. This is one of the many international squabbles in which discussion and mediation should win hands down over the wild-eyed rhetoric of nationalist fanatics. But, as in so many of such disputes, it’s more attractive to beat the nationalist drum than implement measures that would actually further the cause of peace. And, as usual, it is the soldiers who pay the price.